Mr. Grismer, a driver of mining trucks, had a visual disability called homonymous hemianopia (H.H.). The B.C. Superintendent of Motor Vehicles cancelled his driver's licence on the ground that his vision no longer met the minimum standard for peripheral vision. While exceptions to this standard were permitted in some other situations, people with H.H. were not permitted to hold a driver's licence in British Columbia.

The Supreme Court of Canada stated that the key issue was whether the Superintendent's absolute prohibition against individuals being allowed to drive with H.H. was a valid standard according to the criteria decided by the Supreme Court in the 1999 Meiorin ruling (see case summary below). Those criteria require enhanced accommodation for disabilities. An invalid standard may amount to unlawful discrimination.

The Superintendent of Motor Vehicles did commit discrimination by not adequately accommodating Mr. Grismer's disability. The Meiorin case announced that employers and others governed by human rights legislation are now required in all instances to accommodate the characteristics of affected groups within the standards set by these employers, public agencies, and other entities. It is not good enough to maintain discriminatory standards that are merely supplemented by accommodation for those who cannot meet them. If a standard seems, on its surface, to be discriminatory, the employer, public agency, etc., must prove that the discriminatory standard has a bona fide and reasonable justification. The defendant must pass the three parts of "the Meiorin test" (see Meiorin summary below).

While "the Meiorin test" was developed in the employment context, it applies to all claims for discrimination where reasonable accommodation could be an issue, [including educational contexts].

In the Grismer case, Mr. Grismer demonstrated that there was prima facie discrimination, by showing that he was denied a licence on the basis of his visual disability. The Supreme Court found that the Superintendent did not prove that the discriminatory standard had a bona fide reasonable justification. The Superintendent's goal was reasonable highway safety, balancing the need for people to be licensed and the need for public safety. This goal was legitimate and rationally connected to the issuing of drivers' licences; and the standard of requiring a minimum field of vision of 120 degrees was adopted in good faith. But the standard was not reasonably necessary to accomplish the safety goal. For example, many people with less than full peripheral vision can drive safely and Mr. Grismer had been compensating for his disability. Moreover, the Superintendent did not show that the risks or cost associated with providing individual assessment for drivers with H.H. constituted undue hardship. Mr. Grismer should have been given the opportunity to show in an individualized evaluation that he could drive without undue risk.

Meiorin v. British Columbia (1999)
British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3; Supreme Court of Canada

The B.C. government established minimum physical fitness standards for forest fire fighters. A female firefighter who had previously done her work satisfactorily failed to meet one aerobic standard after four attempts. She was dismissed. She and her union filed a grievance that included issues of discrimination. Because of physiological differences, most women have a lower aerobic capacity than most men and, unlike most men, most women could not increase their aerobic capacity enough with training to meet the aerobic standard. Evidence was lacking on whether the prescribed aerobic capacity was necessary for either men or women to perform the work of a forest firefighter safely and efficiently.

One issue was whether the government improperly dismissed the claimant. The broader legal issue was whether the aerobic standard that led to dismissal of the female firefighter unfairly excluded women from forest firefighting jobs and was discriminatory.

The claimant had suffered unlawful discrimination and should be restored to her former job position and compensated for lost wages and benefits. Employers and others governed by human rights legislation are required in all cases to accommodate the traits of affected groups within the standards set by these employers, public agencies, and others. It is not good enough to maintain discriminatory standards and merely mitigate or supplement them through accommodation for those individuals who cannot meet them.

Incorporating accommodation into the standard itself helps to ensure that each person is assessed according to that person's abilities, rather than being judged against presumed group characteristics. Such assumed characteristics are frequently based on bias and historical prejudice and cannot form the basis of reasonably necessary standards.

There are three parts to the Meiorin "test." Once a complainant establishes that a standard is prima facie discriminatory, the respondent/defendant has a duty to prove on a balance of probabilities that the discriminatory standard is a bona fide occupational requirement or has a bona fide and reasonable justification. The respondent must prove that: (1) it adopted the standard for a purpose or goal rationally connected to the relevant function or activity; (2) it adopted the standard in good faith, believing that it was necessary for fulfilling the purpose or goal; and (3) the standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose or goal. Necessity can be shown if the respondent or defendant cannot accommodate persons with the characteristics of the claimant without incurring undue hardship. That hardship could arise because of impossibility, serious risk or excessive cost.

Failure to accommodate may be shown by evidence that the standard was set arbitrarily, or that an individual assessment was unreasonably refused, or in some other way. If the policy or practice is reasonably necessary to an appropriate purpose or goal, and accommodation short of undue hardship is incorporated into the standard, the fact that the standard excludes some people does not constitute discrimination.

Note that the Supreme Court clearly stated that the Meiorin test was a new "unified approach" and was meant to do away with and replace the conventional approach of categorizing discrimination as "direct" or "adverse effect" discrimination.