Reach Canada (TM) Equality and Justice for People with DisabilitiesConference Header image
Homepage
 
spacer used for formattingspacer used for formatting
Working Together for a Shared Future
Conference Proceedings

What is Deafness?

(or, what do we mean when we talk about the "Deaf")

By Andrea Benvenuto

If we ask people in the street: "What does deaf mean?" we may hear a variety of responses such as: "It is someone who does not hear", "someone who does not speak or hear", "someone who is disabled", "a person who talks with his hands and body", etc. We will have to admit, a priori, that everyone is right because they are legitimate answers to the question. We do not intend to question these answers, nor will we seek to find yet another one, but rather to question what they are saying to us "sotto voce". We can then reformulate the question as: "what do we mean when we talk about the "Deaf"?

At first, this question may appear trite. However, when we bring together professionals in mental health, educators, social workers parents and deaf or hearing individuals to discuss our various practices, we cannot deny the fact that, as Michel Foucault suggests, "the discussion (that explains such practices) systematically defines the object which they are discussing."(1) It is beyond my topic to assert that the Deaf are a digressive invention. I would simply ask you to consider, with me, the categories to which we assign topics and permanently set ideas, thereby limiting our own practices.

The Deaf: Deficient or Different

We can discuss deafness as an object, that is define it as an auditory deficiency, as a physical flaw of the body, and of the person so disabled. We can also discuss the relationships that deaf individuals have with their peers, (deaf and hearing) and the impact of the deafness on those relationships. From this perspective, the physical deficiency of the disabled body is supplanted by the social aspect of the problem. In the article by Bernard Mottez, a French sociologist: "in focusing on the deficiency, we often increase the handicap: for example, the Deaf"(2) is undeniable. The distinctions that the author makes between deficiency and handicap and the consequent effects appear to me as invaluable to any conceptual perspective that claims to embrace subtleties of life. Let us briefly explore them.

Deafness: deficiency or handicap?

If deficiency and handicap are part of a whole concept, deficiency refers to the physical aspect, handicap to the social dimension. Deficiency is measurable and required in order to identify the individual within a specific category required by the social organization in order to determine its policies. The extent of the deficiency is technical and not questionable. It situates the subject in purely medical categories by measuring it against the norm. The more an individual differs from the norm, the more he becomes "abnormal" and the more it is perceived as a flaw or a vice of form. We will discuss this further.

From the opposite perspective, always according to Bernard Mottez, as "the totality of situations or social roles from which an individual is excluded by reason of his physical deficiency".(3) This social definition of the handicap emphasizes the relative aspect of the deficiency. The same deficiency will not necessarily result in the same handicap. That is why various social and political organizations will perceive the deficiency as a minor handicap in some cultures, which will lead to marginalization, exclusion, and even incarceration in others. In this context, the handicap is, as opposed to the deficiency, a result of social organization. But, what is the value of this distinction?

When societies propose to reduce the handicap, they can adopt two different perspectives. Either their efforts are intended to change the social organization to eliminate all obstacles to accessibility, in which case we attempt to reduce the handicap, or, they try to reduce the infirmity, hoping thereby to reduce the handicap. The first option mobilizes the collective. The second focuses on the individual; his performance will determine his chances at social integration.

When we refer to the deaf as deficient, we automatically impose a value judgement on an accidental condition. By allowing the deficiency to be the centre of policies and of social, educational and medical practices, we automatically put aside the handicapped person as a member of a community, as a participant in a social organization that works with him towards social integration. When we give preference to the reduction and compensation for the deficiency, do we not irrevocably deny individuality? And is the negation of this individuality as a form of life not simply the negation of life?

Deafness: handicap or difference?

Let us now consider whether deafness is a handicap or a difference. The answers to this question, especially among the hearing, are subject to an endless debate. The positions are often presented so radically that dialectically considering each option appears impossible. We are now so dramatically polarized that we cannot consider one aspect of the problem without eliminating all others.

If we think in terms of handicap, we cannot imagine the existence of a linguistic and cultural minority. At best, sign language may be considered a tool for the acquisition of the official language and deaf culture is just a "deaf thing". If we consider a minority language, cultural differences and community, the handicap disappears.

I wonder what could have driven the deaf to develop a visual/gestual language to communicate other than deafness of the ear. This is specifically what has transformed into an act of life what some (mostly hearing) consider a deficiency. G. Canguilhem wrote: "We may interpret individual singularity either as a failure or as a trial, as an error or as an adventure."(4) If we elect to interpret the singularity of a deaf individual as an adventure, we will recognize a life experience, beyond the physical infirmity that no one can deny, a lifestyle that is different from that of the hearing world. To the extent that value is nothing other than life, (I paraphrase Canguilhem) no other value judgement will be made of the existence of the deaf and their way of being. In the context of health care and other areas, these considerations are of vital importance.

On the other hand, the ideology that has interpreted individual singularity as a failure, as a fault, and that includes the Deaf in the discussion of deficiency via pre-determined political and social measures, directs and limits the perspective professionals, educators and society as a whole has of this human individual who is deaf. We can then justifiably ask: are the subjects limited or is it not rather the social limits that oppress? It is not deafness in itself that prevents individuals from acquiring a language and an identity, from developing cognitive skills and accessing abstract thought, from building communities and developing a culture. The practices that are based solely on the concept of deficiency produce subjects with limitations. However, if we accept deafness, not as an error to be remedied, but as a difference that creates the unique existence of an individual, then, the limits disappear.

It can be stated that the perception of the Deaf as different as opposed to deficient came about when focus was removed from an obsession with the deficiency and directed more towards a recognition of deafness as a way of life, of being part of this community. As the Deaf have gradually assumed new roles in society and in public forums, as they have become individuals with rights (to education and health services, for example) and that research into sign languages have shown that they are indeed languages like all other languages, the move to recognize the existence of the Deaf has provided an opportunity to shed a different light on their singularity. As Bernard Mottez wrote: "We initially credit the Deaf with nothing [...] They must prove everything, even their own existence".(5) We could add that if the hearing have denied the identity of the Deaf in order to more strongly affirm their own, to question the limits of their own normality, it is because their roles are closely linked. The acceptation of the Deaf by the hearing implies that the hearing accept a change in their relation to language, to culture and ultimately themselves. The question can therefore be formulated thus: How can we imagine a world where it is no longer necessary to deny another’s identity in order to assume our own? I would like to pause here to discuss the process of nomenclature, an integral part of this struggle between the negation of the other and the recognition of one’s own existence.

Is it simply a matter of labels?

If we accept that the labeling of a fact, and in this case of an individual, immediately evokes a specific course of action and thought that is different from another label, then the label in itself becomes a political reality that affects all of society. And, if we recall Michel Foucault’s concept which suggests that the language shapes the object being discussed, what can we learn from the multiplicity of appellations that the hearing attribute to the Deaf: born deaf, post-lingual deaf, hard of hearing, deafened, Deaf or real deaf, oral or signing deaf, deaf-mute, hearing impaired, handicapped, disadvantaged, to cite only a few of the terms of the 20th Century; and again, idiot, inferior being, monster, essentially bereft of intelligence, deaf and dumb, as could be heard and read up to the 19th Century? If every historical era has used specific terminology, they have often swung back, as in the movement of a pendulum that warrants analysis. What social, health, educational and legal policies are deployed to respond to the needs identified? Do the subjects respond to the terms we have applied to them? What social changes are required to establish a proper designation and provide a new social standing for the Deaf?

There is little difference between ancient concepts that equated the Deaf to the "village idiot" and the contemporary definitions that considers them as beings who "have difficulties with reasoning and abstract thought". I must now reflect on the etymology and semantics of the word "deaf". The reason for this detour is not to return to tradition but rather to open new areas of exploration, new possibilities. Therein lies the challenge!

Etymology and semantics of the word deaf

In ancient Greek, the semantics of the word “κοφός” (cophos) included a broad range of meanings. The word meant "being deprived of something", "being cut off from ", and that could be sight, smell, etc. A deaf person was one who had been mutilated, the meaning of which was "dulled" or "slashed". The word could therefore mean "blind", "infirm" or on an intellectual level, "dazed" or "stupid".(6) The indo-european sources of the Latin word "surdus" refer to the notion of "noise".

The Greeks did not differentiate between deaf and mute. The lack of oral speech was therefore perceived as the consequence, as an infirmity caused by the absence of hearing. This concept is still believed today. The wording "deaf-mute" or "deaf and dumb" is self evident. The fact that a deaf individual mispronounces the spoken language is not the result of a deficiency in the vocal apparatus, but that of a hearing deficiency which prevents the learning of sounds of a language in a normal manner.

In the figurative sense, cophos meant meek of mind, lacking intelligence. Here, the lack is not material but metaphorical and the image of deafness is used to illustrate it. This figurative use of the word deaf is still current.

From the narrower field of semantics - the one that refers to hearing - of the word deaf, to that of the metaphors which inhabit the phantasms of those who see in deafness the source of all the harm (lack of understanding, communication problems, intellectual deficiency), there always remain traces of the initial connotations.

How did we "name" in the 19th and 20th centuries?

In the 19th century, the word "deaf" was used to identify persons who we would define as "deafened" and "hearing impaired" today. The term was used in the sense of "hard of hearing" while the term "anacusis" defined profound deafness. However, the term "deaf mute" or simply "mute" referred only to person who were born deaf or pre-lingually deaf.(7) In sign language, the deaf referred to hearing individuals by a sign that means "speaking" (the index held horizontally in front of the mouth turning like a reel), yet when referring to themselves, they used a sign that means "deaf-mute", by moving the index from the ear to the mouth. This designation has a long history and is generally accepted by the Deaf.

In the 20th century, specialized publications and numerous educational institutions began to change the name. Oralist educators who claimed that the majority of students spoke, progressively began to use the term "deaf-mute" by "hearing impaired", "hard of hearing", "hypoacoustic", which, according to B. Mottez, marks the start of the "medicalization" of deafness.(8) The terminology which then becomes prevalent is that of the semantics of the word "deaf" in ancient Greek, "to be deprived of something". Something is missing even though it may not be absolute. This will justify the development of medical techniques that aim to remedy this deficiency. A few years later, the Deaf will assert their claim to sign language as an alternative to oralism and the word "mute" will be replaced by the term "silent"; silent associations, silent press, silent sports. In the 1970's, a new term emerges, capitalized "Deaf" affirming that they are member of a sociological reality and definite linguistic group.(9)

In recent years, another expression: "deaf person" is being used to refer to the Deaf. The aim is to not identify the person with the handicap but to see deafness as an attribute of the person. Therefore, from this perspective, we do not refer to a handicapped but rather to a "person with a disability", "living with a disability" or "disabled person", etc. Some terminologies affirm identity while others invalidate it. The terminology can thus become a strategic element in denying the existence of others. The terminology used to name the Deaf - and other persons with disabilities - appear to be a way to bring the individual closer to normality. "Remove the barrier and you will have the norm", stated Canguilhem.(10) Everything happens as if the person before us did not exist in their uniqueness. In refusing to name them, we deny them their place in society and even their existence. Mottez comments: "...with regards to the deaf-mute, within a century we have changed from using a noun to using an adjective and from an anthropological or sociological category defining these persons to a purely medical category".(11)

Normality and Pathology

This medical categorization of the Deaf brings us back to the subject of the norm which I discussed earlier. The concepts of "normal" and "pathological" are inevitable in medicine. However, their meaning is often far from evident. Is pathology the opposite of normality? What is the relation between these two concepts? How does reference to these concepts enlighten our practices?

Normality usually refers either to an ideal, a prototype or a perfect form or to a fact that can be defined statistically. According to G. Canguilhem, the fundamental issue is whether we should consider life as a system of laws of nature or as an organization of properties. Should we refer to the laws of life or to the order of life?

When we discuss the laws of nature, singular phenomena are perceived as aberrations. Anything that differs from the law, that is anything that differs, is considered a failure or a flaw. The singular is irregular and thus differs from the norm. From this perspective, atypical individual cases appear as "pathological cases".

When we consider the order of life or life as an organization of properties, we perceive a hierarchy of functions whose stability is necessarily precarious. This unstable equilibrium is the result of adjustments and compromises between various powers and competition.. From this perspective, "the irregularity or anomaly is not perceived as an accident affecting an individual but his very existence". The individual has the capacity to produce something new. That is the basic condition of his life. If singularity is seen as a failure, judgement can only be negative. But, if we consider it as an adventure, its positive value will be a condition of the ability to adapt to life. In this sense, and considering the thousand and one ways to live, we cannot talk about the difference between a "failed lifestyle" and a "successful lifestyle". There is a priori no difference.

Let us come back to the Deaf. Deafness may be considered as a divergence from the norm and then the deaf individual is the one who lives outside the norm. He is deprived of hearing and the role of medicine is to restore him back to the norm. Everything revolves around care.

However, if deafness is perceived as a specific organization of the order of life, it is then outside the realm of pathology in the production of a specific lifestyle. In this case, the terms normal and pathological have no absolute value. Deafness, no more than "hearingness" can be the source of an individual’s malediction. One cannot define an individual as normal or pathological as such, nor of a normal or pathological environment. This can only occur if we relate the subject to the environment.

Therefore, from this perspective, the task becomes immense. It acquires a political, social and ethical character and, as such, will never find its place in the solitude of thought and action. It is a public question in the sense of res publica, a question which belongs to, and emanates from the social community, and we all belong to this community.


Notes:

  1. Michel Foucault, L’archéologie du savoir, Paris, Gallimard, 1969, p. 49
  2. Bernard Mottez, "A s’obstiner contre les différences, on augmente souvent le handicap: l’exemple des sourds" in Coup d’oeil, Éd. B Mottez, H. Markowicz, Centre d’Étude des Mouvements Sociaux, EHESS, no. 39, 1884. Premier publication in Sociologie et Société, Montréal, 1977.
  3. Bernard Mottez op.cit., p. 3
  4. Georges Canguilhem, "Le Normal et la Pathologie" (1951), in La connaissance de la vie, Paris, J. Vrin, 1998, p. 159.
  5. Bernard Mottez, "Les sourds existent-ils?", in Psychanalystes, revue du Collège des Psychanalystes, Paris, No 46-47, 1993, p. 57.
  6. Ienke Keijzer, La surdité dans la société gréco-romaine, Mémoire de maîtrise Lettres Classiques, Université Paul Valéry, Montpellier, 1995-1996, p. 17.
  7. Bernard Mottez, Une entreprise de dé-nomination: Les avatars du vocabulaire pour désigner les sourds au XIXe et XXe siècles, H. J. Stiker, M. Vial, C. Barral (dir.), Fragments pour une histoire: notions et acteurs, Paris, Alter, diffusion CTNERHI, 1996, p. 101
  8. Ibid., p. 108
  9. Ibid., p. 110
  10. Georges Canguilhem, "La monstruosité et le monstrueux", La connaissance de la vie, Paris, J. Vrin, 1998, p. 180.
  11. Bernard Mottez, op.cit., p. 109

Andrea Benvenuto
Université Paris 8
Ottawa, September 2004

return to top

Table of Contents
...Back Next...
 

Français

 

spacer used for formatting